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Abstract
In most Initial Public O¤erings (IPO) in the world, the underwriter selects syndicate
members and uses the information of their investorsclientele to set the o¤ering price.
The objective of this paper is to develop a model of the "book building" process in which
the formation of the syndicate is an endogenous decision variable. More specically, I
will examine in which cases the lead underwriter will benet from selecting syndicate
members with di¤erent investors clientele characterized by a specic line of expertise. I
model the fact that di¤erent investors have di¤erent lines of expertise in assuming that
the uncertainty about the value of the shares has two dimensions. One may think about
those two dimensions as information elicited from retail and institutional investors. An-
other interpretation may be that the rst dimension is an industry-specic information
and the second one, information from a local underwriter. A lead underwriter may also
value both particular information about the issuer and indications of interest from key
institutional investors coming from previous relationships of a syndicate member. In
previous IPOs models with one dimensional uncertainty about the value of the shares,
the underwriter must underprice shares to extract information from investors. Informa-
tional rents are therefore concealed to these investors in order to induce them to reveal
their information and this results in underpricing. In this multi-dimensional context, I
prove that it is not always optimal for the decision-maker to acquire all available infor-
mation about the value of the shares. When deciding which syndicates organization
she wants to implement, the underwriter faces a trade o¤ between the cost of extract-
ing information and the informational e¢ ciency. I show that it is optimal for the lead
underwriter to select syndicate members having investorsclienteles with di¤erent lines
of expertise when she faces a great informational problem, when she values more price
accuracy, when the rm going public is more transparent, riskier, and when the capacity
of the retail investors increases, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
Keywords: Initial Public O¤erings, Expertise, Asymmetric Information, Value of
Information.
JEL Classication: D82, G2
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Diversication of Investors Expertise in IPOs
1 Introduction
Despite the diversity of selling mechanisms1, most of the Initial Public O¤erings (IPOs) in
the world, and particularly in the US, are marketed through the book buildingmethod.
In this issuing procedure, the lead underwriter rst selects the syndicate members who
share with her the underwriting functions. Then, during the road show, she meets insti-
tutional investors who are invited by the syndicate members, from which she elicits some
indications of interest about the rm. Finally, the o¤ering price and quantities are chosen
by the lead underwriter, using these indications of interest. Forming the syndicate is thus
a fundamental step to make a successful IPO. Moreover, as each member of the syndicate
has a specic investorsclientele, the lead underwriter should form the syndicate according
to her objective in terms of information production.
The objective of this paper is to study the optimal design of the syndicate in IPOs.
More specically, I analyze when it is benecial for the lead underwriter to choose syndicate
members with di¤erent clienteles of investors, each of them having a specic line of expertise.
This should explain the emergence of di¤erent IPO syndicate structures.
There is strong empirical evidence that lead underwriters take into account the speci-
city of each member of the syndicate. Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) show
that the integration of U.S. banks in IPOs conducted outside the United States may reduce
signicantly underpricing. Indeed, U.S. banks have a longer experience of the book build-
ing method. They also have access to an investorsclientele helpful in providing a more
accurate demand for the shares. This gives them an advantage compared to local banks.
However, local banks are needed because of their knowledge of the issuer. Song (2004b)
notes that commercial banks and investment banks have di¤erent comparative advantages
as underwriters. Commercial banks possess a better certication ability while investment
banks have a better distribution ability2. Song (2004b) proves that those advantages are
each valued by di¤erent issuers. She provides empirical evidence that, compared to pure
investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates with commercial banks as co-managers tend
to underwrite issues facing a greater information problem3. Narayanan et al. (2004) nd
that when lending banks and non-lending investment banks co-managed an issue, the total
issuance costs are reduced. Such a syndicate structure benets from the reputation of in-
vestment banks and the lower spreads of lending banks. Cooney et al. (2004) note that the
criteria used to form an IPO underwriting syndicate might include (1) nancial strength,
1See Biais and Faugeron Crouzet (2002), Derrien and Womack (2003), Sherman (2001), among others,
for an extensive description of these mechanisms.
2Puri (1996) also investigates those di¤erences between commercial and investment banks.
3Such issues are for instance smaller rms with lower stock ranking and less prior access to the capital
markets.
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(2) ability to distribute the security to a particular type of buyer and/or geographic area,
(3) research capability, (4) market making strength, and (5) geographic location of the is-
suing rm. Palmer & Dodge, the famous U.S. law rm, corroborate this view. According
to their website4, an issuer should consider the institutional and retail sales capacity of
each investment bank. Some underwriters cater almost exclusively to institutional investors,
while others have a broad retailbusiness directed to individual shareholders. Many believe
that it is advantageous to make sales to both types of investors... The strength of this syndi-
cate is quite important. For example, even if the managing underwriters exclusively target
institutional investors, they can ensure distribution to individuals through their choice of
the other underwriters to be included in the syndicate. They also note that Certain un-
derwriters may have a strong reputation in one industry but not in others, so in evaluating
reputation a company should focus on the appropriate types of deals. Technology company
IPOs often involve a lead manager from a large investment bank with a smaller co-manager
with industry expertise.
In this paper, I develop a model of the book building process, in the line of Ben-
veniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), in which the formation of
the syndicate is an endogenous decision variable. A lead underwriter forms a syndicate
to underwrite and distribute the issue. Each member of the syndicate has a particular
investorsclientele with a specic line of expertise. When selecting the syndicate members,
the lead underwriter perfectly knows the line of expertise of their investorsclientele. De-
signing the organization of the syndicate is therefore equivalent to directly selecting the
institutional investors who will participate to the IPO.
To study such an environment, I make two assumptions. First, to model the fact that
di¤erent investors have di¤erent lines of expertise, it is assumed that the uncertainty about
the value of the shares has two dimensions. One may think about those two dimensions as
information elicited from retail and institutional investors. Another interpretation may be
that the rst dimension is an industry-specic information and the second one, information
from a local underwriter. A lead underwriter may also value both particular information
about the issuer and indications of interest from key institutional investors coming from
previous relationships of a syndicate member. Second, the lead underwriter is assumed to
benet from the information elicited from investors because it enhances pricing accuracy.
Accurate pricing might be valued by both the lead underwriter and the owners of a rm for
many reasons. When a rm goes public, owners often keep shares for their own account and
foresee coming back to the market later. If the value of the shares is close to its real value,
the owners will get some benets in the future. Loughran and Ritter (2002) state that, for
agency reasons, managers may think that their future job performance will be more valued
if the initial shares are priced more accurately. There are many other reasons for which
the lead underwriter would value more accurate pricing, such as better investment choices,
4Their website is www.palmerdodge.com
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underwriter reputation, issuer signaling (see Sherman, 2001), but also lawsuit avoidance
(see Sherman and Titman, 2002).
The participants in the IPO are the seller, the lead underwriter who acts in the best
interest of the seller, and the investors. The investors can be divided in two distinct groups.
The rst group is composed of large, institutional, investors who each can costlessly gather
information about only one dimension of the value of the shares. The second group is
formed by small, retail investors who cannot absorb the whole issue. These retail investors
cannot gather any information about the value of the rm. Institutional investors can only
gather information in one dimension of the value of the shares because of the short period of
time during which an IPO takes place. Due to this time constraint, institutional investors
cannot collect information along another dimension than their line of expertise.
The lead underwriter may choose two di¤erent organizations for the syndicate. Within
the rst organization, called a specialized syndicate, the syndicate members have investors
clienteles with the same line of expertise, whereas within the second one, labelled as a
diversied syndicate, their investorsclientele have di¤erent lines of expertise.
In this context, I rst study the optimal direct mechanism and its implementation
when the lead underwriter forms a specialized syndicate. Within a specialized syndicate,
selected institutional investors have the same line of expertise. When they are informed,
they observe the same signal about the value of the shares. I show that the lead underwriter
can relatively cheaply induce them to tell the truth as she can compare their reports. This
allows her to underprice the shares only in good states of the nature. Institutional investors
observing a good signal get a positive informational rent in order to induce them to reveal
the truth. However, shares are not underpriced in other states of the nature. This results
in no rents for investors with a bad signal and uninformed ones. The retail, uninformed,
investors face a kind of winners curse problem, since they only get some shares when
their value is low.
When the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate, the members of the syndicate
have investorsclientele with di¤erent lines of expertise. Once again, institutional investors
with a good signal get positive rents. However, I show that due to the independence of
investorssignals, positive rents must be granted to uninformed investors in order to induce
truthful revelation of their information. It turns out that the shares are now underpriced
when at least a good or an uninformative signal is reported. The winners curseproblem
faced by the retail, uninformed, investors is less severe than in the previous case as they
also receive positive rents. Indeed, the lead underwriter allocates them a positive quantity
when she receives at least an uninformative signal. Intuitively, if retail investors get the
maximum quantity they can absorb in those states of the nature, the quantity allocated to
institutional investors with an uninformative signal is lowered. This reduces the incentives
of an institutional investor with a good signal to misreport. The lead underwriter may
therefore capture a part of their informational rent. This results by a positive rent for retail
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investors.
There are two main di¤erences between those two organizations. First, as the signals are
independent under a diversied syndicate, each investorsclientele has a kind of monopoly
power on the information it has gathered, whereas by forming a specialized syndicate,
the lead underwriter may use the correlation between investorssignals. This allows her to
concede lower informational rents to the investors. This implies that underpricing is needed
in less states of the nature to extract information about the value of the shares. Second, if
the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate instead of a specialized one, information
about both dimensions of the value of the rm is now available to set the o¤ering price.
This improves the expected revenues as there are economic benets associated with pricing
accuracy.
I then analyze the trade-o¤ between those two e¤ects to which the seller is facing. I
show that the region of the parameter space in which designing a diversied syndicate is
more protable than designing a specialized one is extended when the lead underwriter
values more price accuracy, when the rm going public is more transparent, riskier, and
when the capacity of the retail investors increases.
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990)5 have been the rst to
study the underpricing phenomenon in IPOs underwrited with the book buildingmethod.
They argue that nancial intermediaries must underprice shares to extract information from
institutional investors. Informational rents are therefore conceded to these investors in order
to induce them to reveal their information and this results in underpricing. My analysis
extends their work in considering a two-dimensional uncertainty about the rms value.
This allows me to enhance the understanding of the relationship between the repartition
of informational rents among institutional investors and the formation of the syndicate
structure.
While underpricing is well studied in the IPO literature, less attention has been devoted
to the selection of the syndicate members. Notable exceptions are Corwin and Schultz
(2005) and Song (2004a). Corwin and Schultz (2005) analyze the structure of IPO syndi-
cates and nd evidence that syndicate members have a crucial role in enhancing information
production6. Song (2004a) examines the entry of commercial banks into a syndicate. The
main result of this paper is that the organization of the syndicate crucially depends on
the characteristics of the rms going public. The empirical ndings of those papers are
consistent with my results. The lead underwriter must take into account the expertise
of the syndicate members or their investorsclientele when designing the structure of the
5More recent papers about the book building process include Sherman (2001), Biais and Faugeron Crouzet
(2002), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Derrien and Womack (2003), Jenkinson, Ljungqvist, and Wilhelm
(2003), and Maksimovic and Pichler (2004).
6They also nd that previous relationships among syndicate members serve an important role in future
syndicate organizations. See also Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) for a theoretical analysis of such an argument.
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syndicate.7
Another related paper is Sherman and Titman (2002). They analyze why lead un-
derwriters limit the number of investors participating in the IPO process. Their model
is based on premises that gathering of information is costly, but generating information
allows pricing more accurately the shares in the secondary market. They show that the
lead underwriter faces a trade o¤ when she selects the number of investors: the greater
is the number of investors, the most accurately the shares are priced, but, the greater is
the underpricing. Maksimovic and Pichler (2004) also study how a lead underwriter de-
termines the number of syndicate participants. In both models, institutional investors are
not di¤erentiated with respect to their line of expertise8. When selecting the investors,
the lead underwriter is only interested in their number and not in their intrinsic qualities.
Instead my model considers the selection of investors with respect to their line of expertise.
This allows me to describe another choice of the lead underwriter and to characterize the
relationship between the multidimensional structure of information about the issuer and
the features of the syndicate.
From a purely theoretical perspective, my article may be viewed as studying the design
of expertise with multiple experts. The nearest theoretical paper from mine is Gromb
and Martimort (2004). Gromb and Martimort (2004) study the optimal design of incentive
contracts for experts and the implications for the organization of delegated expertise. When
contracts are report-based, they show that the principal prefers to rely on two experts
rather than relying on one expert who has to collect two signals. However, in Gromb
and Martimort (2004), the experts only gather signals about the same information while
in my model, experts (investors) may observe signals about di¤erent dimensions of the
information. This adds a new dimension to the analysis that allows me to endogenize in a
di¤erent way the structure of the organization of delegated expertise.
La¤ont and Martimort (1999) prove that separating the available information between
several regulators improves social welfare. However, in their model, the benets from
separation come from the fact that it makes collusion less sustainable whereas in my paper,
the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate in order to improve the information
elicited from investors. Moreover, in the framework that I analyze, di¤erent organizations
may emerge while in La¤ont and Martimort (1999) separation is always optimal.
Cremer and McLean (1988) and La¤ont and Martimort (2000) show that correlation
between agents signals allows the principal to elicit this information costlessly compared
to the case of independent signals. My paper deviates from theirs in several respects.
First, the informed investors may gather uninformative signals in my model. This makes
7This result is also shared by the literature on syndication in venture capital or loans. See for instance,
Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2004) or Su (2005).
8Even though uncertainty about the value of the shares has two dimensions in Maksimovic and Pichler
(2004), investors randomly gather information about only one of both dimensions.
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extraction of rents more costly even in the case of perfectly correlated information. Second,
the presence of retail investors changes the allocation of rents. Indeed, they receive a part
of the rent previously allocated to good typesinvestors in La¤ont and Martimorts (2000)
analysis. Finally, I study the optimal organization structure when the lead underwriter can
determine the informational features of the group of buyers.
My work is also related to the literature on share auctions9. The mainstream of this
literature mainly focuses on uniform versus discriminatory auctions. In a complete infor-
mation framework, Back and Zender (1993) show that the revenue generated is never less
in a discriminatory auction than in a uniform price auction. However, Wang and Zender
(2002) prove that, once incomplete information is assumed, a ranking of those two auc-
tioning mechanisms is not possible as there exists cases in which uniform price auctions
dominate discriminatory auctions and vice versa. Instead, I study the optimal mechanism
when the uncertainty about the value of the good is two-dimensional and when the seller
may select the pool of bidders he will face10.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section
3, I study the optimal direct mechanism and its implementation when the lead underwriter
forms a specialized syndicate. Section 4 describes the case of a diversied syndicate. The
fth section examines when the lead underwriter is better o¤ with one of the previous
organizations. I also analyze in this section the comparative statics and highlight the
empirical implications of my results. Finally, section 6 concludes and all proofs are in
section 7.
2 The Model
A seller needs capital in order to invest in a project, and decides to sell S shares of his
rm using an underwriter. This lead underwriter needs information to price the shares.
This information may be elicited from other underwriters. The lead underwriter therefore
forms a syndicate to underwrite and distribute the issue. Each member of the syndicate
has a specic investorsclientele with a specic line of expertise. I assume that when the
lead underwriter selects syndicate members she takes into account the line of expertise of
her investorsclientele. Designing the organization of the syndicate is therefore equivalent
to directly selecting the investors who will participate to the IPO. The participants in the
IPO are therefore the seller, the lead underwriter who acts in the best interest of the seller,
and the investors. The market is formed by two types of rational and risk neutral investors.
Large institutional investors can costlessly gather information about the valuation of the
9This literature begun with Wilsons (1979) seminal paper. Those results have been generalized by Back
and Zender (1993), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and Wang and Zender (2002) among others.
10She may select either bidders with correlated signals (specialized syndicate) either bidders with inde-
pendent signals (diversied syndicate).
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rm on the market and have large bidding capacity. Small uninformed retail investors
cannot gather any information, and cannot collectively absorb the whole issue. To simplify
the analysis, I assume that there are only two institutional investors11, each being client from
a di¤erent syndicate member, and two dimensions of information. Those two dimensions
may represent the syndicate memberscharacteristics12.
The available information has two components, each representing a direction in which
an institutional investor can specialize in gathering information. Each institutional investor
has a line of expertise and can only gather information in the direction of his line of expertise.
I model information gathering by a private signal si; i = 1; 2, which can be either good (g),
or bad (b), or uninformative (u):
When institutional investors receive an uninformative signal (u), they stay as unin-
formed as when they do not gather information along this dimension of information. Thus,
receiving signal (u), or receiving no signal is informationally equivalent. Then, I also use
(u) when no information has been gathered in one dimension of the information.
Gathering of information is not observable by the lead underwriter, institutional in-
vestors can therefore claim that they have received a private signal even when they did not
gather any information.
The signal received by each institutional investor may be uninformative, (u) with prob-
ability (1   ); or informative with probability (); in this case, the signal could be good
(g) with probability (); or bad (b) with probability (1  ):
The expected value of the shares is the sum of the expected values in each dimension.
When investor 1 (resp. 2) received a private signal s1 (resp. s2), the value of the shares in
dimension i is Vi(s1; s2): Vi(s1; s2) is symmetric in (s1; s2) and:
Vi(g; g) = Vi(g; u) = u + g;
Vi(b; b) = Vi(b; u) = u   b;
Vi(u; u) = u;
with u = Vi(g; g) + (1  )Vi(b; b):
The lead underwriter may form two di¤erent organization structures, the rst one, called
specialized syndicate is such that the selected institutional investors have the same line of
expertise; the second one which is labeled diversied syndicate is such that institutional
investors have di¤erent lines of expertise. Within a specialized organization, there is per-
fect correlation between informative signals meaning that when both investors receive an
informative signal, (g or b), they receive the same signal. However, it could be the case
11Having only two institutional investors in the mechanism may be a restriction for the underwriter (see
Sherman and Titman, 2002), but this could be explained by regulatory requirements. Another explanation
may be that having many investors is too costly for the underwriter. She may have to pay the costs for
gathering information to the investors.
12 Interpretations of those di¤erent characteristics are presented in the Introduction.
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that one of them receives an informative signal while the other receives an uninformative
signal (signal u). Within a diversied organization, the signals that investors receive are
independently distributed.
Retail investors may be considered as a fringe, and cannot purchase more than S(1 k)
shares, with k 2 (0; 1) : In this model, k is exogenous and (1   k) reects the degree of
participation (or the capacity) of retail investors.
The lead underwriter acts in the best interest of the seller. Moreover, she can di¤er-
entiate the institutional from the retail investors, and also observe the line of expertise of
an institutional investor. She is risk neutral and her objective is to maximize the expected
proceeds minus a term which reects her valuation for a more accurate valuation, f()13.
In other words, the lead underwriter is not only interested in high expected proceeds, but
also in the accuracy of the information elicited from investors.  is the probability that the
true state is not discovered in both directions. All throughout the paper, I assume that
f() > 0 for all  2 (0; 1), f 0(:) > 0, f 00(:)  0 and  > 014.
Consider a setting with three periods. First, at date 1, the strategic lead underwriter
selects the syndicate members depending on the lines of expertise of their investorsclien-
tele. She also announces price and quantities schedule. Institutional investors then decide
whether or not to gather information and also to reveal it or not to the lead underwriter. Fi-
nally, the lead underwriter sets the o¤ering price based on the information she has elicited
from the institutional investors and the previously announced schedules. At date 2, the
shares are traded, and nally, at date 3, the state of nature is publicly revealed. The timing
of the game is described in Figure 1.
The lead underwriter proposes the following direct mechanism G to the investors15.
Each institutional investor send a message mi announcing his private information, good,
bad, or uninformative. The mechanism maps these messages into a price p(m1;m2) and
quantities qi(m1;m2) for institutional investor i and qu(m1;m2) for retail investors.
I denote G = fp(:; :); q1(:; :); q2(:; :); qu(:; :)g this mechanism:
One could remark that this mechanism doesnt allow price discrimination16, but only
quantity discrimination (which is needed to induce institutional investors to reveal their
information). This is in line with what is observed in practice for IPOs.
13Benets of pricing accuracy for the lead underwriter or the issuer are discussed in the introduction.
14Those assumptions are the same as in Sherman (2001).
15From the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in considering only direct mechanisms.
16Benveniste and Wilhem (1990) show that the underwriter could raise the expected prots of the rm
in using price discrimination. However, Biais, Bossaerts and Rochet (2002) show that uniform pricing is
optimal under collusion between institutional investors and the underwriter.
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Figure 1: Timing of the game
3 Specialized syndicate
In this section, I analyze the case in which the lead underwriter wants to form a specialized
syndicate and selects two investors who have the same line of expertise.
Lets consider Nash equilibria implementation, so that an institutional investor has
incentives to gather information and to reveal his true signal, provided that the other one
truly reveals information.
To set ideas, it is assumed that both institutional investors gather information in the
rst direction. This is without loss of generality, because both directions are symmetric.
Since institutional investors do not receive signals in the second direction, the expected
value of shares is V = V1(s1; s2) + u when the received signals are (s1; s2).
To simplify the notation, let, V (s1; s2); p(m1;m2); qi(m1;m2); i = 1; 2; u; respectively
be the expected value of the shares, the o¤ering price and the quantity allocated to investor
i, if the signals received by the institutional investors are (s1; s2) ; and the messages sent
are (m1;m2):
3.1 The program of the lead underwriter
In this subsection, I describe the program of the lead underwriter who maximizes her
objective under the constraints that all the investors participate to the mechanism and
that institutional investors gather information and truthfully reveal it17.
17As we assume there is no cost of gathering information, this last constraint is always satised, due to
the participation constraint, so we will omit it throughout the paper.
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The incentive constraints of the problem are the following:
An institutional investor with an informative signal s should not report that he is
uninformed:
U1(s)  (1  )q(u; u) [V (s)  p(u; u)] + q(u; s) [V (s)  p(s; u)] (1)
where U1(s) = (1  )q(s; u) [V (s)  p(s; u)] + q(s; s) [V (s)  p(s; s)] ; for s 2 fg; bg:
An uninformed institutional investor should not report he has received an informative
signal s:
U1(u)  (1  )q(s; u) [V (u)  p(s; u)] + q(s; s) [V (s)  p(s; s)] (2)
where
U1(u) = (1  )q(u; u) [V (u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (g)  p(g; u)]
+(1  )q(u; b) [V (b)  p(b; u)] ; for s 2 fg; bg:
Finally, the global incentive constraints, i.e. an institutional investor with a good signal
should not report he has received a bad signal, or conversely:
U1(s)  (1  )q(s0; u) [V (s)  p(s0; u)] + q(s0; s) [V (s)  p(s0; s)] (3)
for s 2 fg; bg and s0 2 fg; bg, s 6= s0:
All investors (informed and uninformed one) have to be induced to participate to the
mechanism, which give the following ex post18 participation constraints:
V (s)  p(s; s), for s 2 fg; b; ug: (4)
V (s)  p(s; u), for s 2 fg; bg: (5)
One must add to these constraints that all shares must be sold, i.e.:
q1(m1;m2) + q2(m1;m2) + qu(m1;m2) = S (6)
As already mentioned, the lead underwriter maximizes the expected proceeds from the
IPO minus f(); a term which reects her valuation for a more accurate valuation under
the previous constraints. This gives the following program of the lead underwriter:
Max fSE(p)  f()g
q(:; :); p(:; :)
s:t:(1); (2); (3); (4); (5); (6):
with:
E(p) = (1  )2p(u; u) + 2(p(g; g) + (1  )p(b; b))
+2(1  )(p(g; u) + (1  )p(b; u)):
Lets remark that in this case,  = 1: Indeed, as no experts gather information in the
second dimension, the true state is never discovered in both dimensions.
18They still want to participate to the mechanism when all the information about the value of the shares
is common knowledge.
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3.2 The equilibrium
The following proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium which is solution of
the program of the lead underwriter when she forms a specialized syndicate.
Proposition 1 The optimal policy for a lead underwriter who wants to form a specialized
syndicate is to concede:
 a positive informational rent of an institutional investor with a good signal:
Ug = g(1  )kS2 ; (7)
 no informational rent of an institutional investor with an uninformative or bad signal:
Uu = 0 and Ub = 0;
 no rent for retail investors.
Proof. The proof of this proposition, as well as those of the propositions and the
lemmas of the following sections are in the appendix.
In the optimal mechanism, only institutional investors with a good signal get an infor-
mational rent. In order to induce institutional investors with a good signal to truthfully
reveal their information, the lead underwriter must underprice the shares in some states of
nature.
Shares do not need to be underpriced when at least one institutional investor announces
a bad signal, or both institutional investors announce uninformative signals. Indeed, when
institutional investors gather information in the same direction, signals are perfectly cor-
related if they are informative. This allows the lead underwriter not to give any rent to
institutional investors observing a bad signal and uninformed ones. However, despite the
perfect correlation of the two institutional investorssignals, the lead underwriter cannot
extract all the investorssurplus, as in Cremer and McLean (1988), in giving no share to the
institutional investors when they announce di¤erent signals. This is due to two premises.
First, there exists a non zero probability not to obtain an informative signal. Second, the
retail investors cannot absorb the whole issue.
When at least one good signal is sent, prices are indeterminate as long as the incen-
tive compatibility conditions are satised. This means that the optimal mechanism can be
implemented in various ways. The only restriction is that the incentive compatibility con-
straint (1) for an institutional investor with an informative signal g is satised. This gives
rise to informational rents for the institutional investors with a good signal. For instance,
the lead underwriter could only underprice when both institutional investors announce good
signals as in Biais and Faugeron Crouzet (2002).
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Moreover, the lead underwriter, in order to reduce the incentives to lie, does not
give any shares to the investors, if they announce two contradictory informative signals,
((g; b); (b; g)). So, the quantity allocated to each investor is zero if one of them announces
a good signal while the other one announces a bad signal.
In the cases in which at least one institutional investor announces a bad signal, or both
announce uninformative signals, the quantities allocated to the informed investors are the
lowest possible given that uninformed investors cannot absorb the whole issue.
The loss in the expected proceeds from the IPO is proportional to the quantity of
shares which cannot be absorbed by the retail investors (kS). This implies that if the retail
investors could absorb the whole issue, the lead underwriter could completely eliminate
underpricing19.
Lets note that the retail investors face a kind of winners curseproblem, since they
only receive shares if the value of the rm is low or uncertain. Thus, they only get shares
when they are not underpriced and do not get any rent.
Finally one can remark that the quantities allocated to each institutional investor are
increasing in the signal he sends, and decreasing in the signal the other one sends.
4 Diversied syndicate
This section studies the case in which the lead underwriter wants to form a diversied syn-
dicate, and thus, selects two institutional investors who have two di¤erent lines of expertise.
Contrary to the previous section, their signals are now independently distributed. They
could now receive di¤erent signals even though they are informative.
This assumption changes radically the problem. Indeed, when an institutional investor
receives an informative signal, the lead underwriter cannot guess what the signal of the
other one is. Hence, she is not able to use this comparison to induce institutional investors
to reveal the truth.
In this case, the institutional investors have a kind of local monopoly power on the
private information they have gathered, and so could aspire to higher informational rents.
However, the loss in the lead underwriters benets (compared to the previous section), due
to this increase of the rents, could be compensated by an improvement of the informational
e¢ ciency of the market.
Again, lets consider Nash equilibria in which institutional investors have incentives to
gather information and to reveal their true signal, provided that the other one truly reveals
his information.
19This is because there is no cost to acquire information. Otherwise, there would be a minimal k that
ensures information acquisition.
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For simplicity, it is assumed that institutional investor 1 (resp. 2) gather information
in the rst (resp. second) direction20.
Since institutional investors receive only one signal, but in opposite directions, the
expected value of the shares is V = V1(s1; u) + V2(s2; u) when the received signals are
(s1; s2).
Likewise the previous section, let, V (s1; s2); p(m1;m2); qi(m1;m2); i = 1; 2; u; respec-
tively be the expected value of the shares, the o¤ering price and the quantity allocated to
investor i, if the signals received by the investors are (s1; s2) ; and the messages send are
(m1;m2):
4.1 The program of the lead underwriter
The program of the lead underwriter is again to maximize her objective function under the
participation and incentive constraints.
However, the incentive constraints of the problem are now di¤erent. They are given by
the following conditions:
An institutional investor with an informative signal s prefers to report truthfully his
signal instead of reporting that he is uninformed:
U2(s)  (1  )q(u; u) [V (s; u)  p(u; u)]
+q(u; g) [V (s; g)  p(g; u)] + (1  )q(u; b) [V (s; b)  p(b; u)] ; (8)
where:
U2(s) = (1  )q(s; u) [V (s; u)  p(s; u)] + q(s; g) [V (s; g)  p(s; g)]
+(1  )q(s; b) [V (s; b)  p(s; b)] :
An uninformed institutional investor should not report an informative signal:
U2(u)  (1  )q(s; u) [V (u; u)  p(s; u)]
+q(s; g) [V (g; u)  p(s; g)] + (1  )q(s; b) [V (b; u)  p(s; b)] ; (9)
where:
U2(u) = (1  )q(u; u) [V (u; u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (g; u)  p(g; u)]
+(1  )q(u; b) [V (b; u)  p(b; u)] :
Finally, the global incentive constraints, i.e. an institutional investor with an informative
signal s; should not report informative signal s
0
:
U2(s)  (1  )q(s0; u) [V (s; u)  p(s0; u)]
+q(s0; g) [V (g; s)  p(s0; g)] + (1  )q(s0; b) [V (b; s)  p(s0; b)] ; (10)
for s; s0 2 fg; bg2, s 6= s0:
20This is without loss of generality because the two directions are symmetric.
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The ex post participation constraints are:
V (s; s0)  p(s; s0), for s; s0 2 fg; b; ug: (11)
Again, all shares must be sold, i.e.:
q1(m1;m2) + q2(m1;m2) + qu(m1;m2) = S (6)
The lead underwriter is maximizing the expected proceeds, minus a term that reects the
possibility of price inaccuracy, under the incentive constraints, the participation constraints,
and the gathering information constraints.
This gives the following program for the lead underwriter:
Max fSE(p)  Ef()g
q(:; :); p(:; :)
s:t:(8); (9); (10); (11); (6):
with:
E(p) = (1  )2p(u; u) + 2(2p(g; g) + (1  )2p(b; b)) + 22(1  )p(g; b)
+2(1  )(p(g; u) + (1  )p(b; u));
Now, I have  = 1   2: Indeed, as each expert gather an informative signal with
probability , the true state is discovered in both dimensions with probability 2.
4.2 The equilibrium
There is a unique Nash equilibrium which is solution of this program of the lead underwriter.
It is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal policy for a lead underwriter who wants to form a diversied
syndicate is to concede:
 a positive informational rent of an institutional investor with a good signal:
Ug = g
kS
2 [(1  ) + 2(1  ) + ] ; (12)
 a positive informational rent of an institutional investor with an uninformative signal:
Uu = g
kS
2 ;
 no informational rent of an institutional investor with a bad signal: Ub = 0;
 a positive rent for retail investors: Un = 2(1  ) (1 k)k Uu:
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When institutional investors gather information in di¤erent directions, in the optimal
mechanism, institutional investors with a good signal and also with an uninformative signal
get an informational rent. Again, shares are underpriced in order to induce institutional
investors not to misreport their signal. However, this underpricing corresponds not only
to the informational rent of institutional investors with good signals as in the previous
section, but also to the rent of those with uninformative signals. Institutional investors
with an uninformative signal get an informational rent in order to induce them to reveal
the truth and not to send a bad signal.
More underpricing in this section is due to the independence of the signals. The lead
underwriter cannot use the information revealed by an institutional investor to force the
other one to reveal his true signal. She must give positive quantities to institutional investors
who announce di¤erent signals and cannot punish them as in the previous section. The
institutional investors have a local monopoly on their private information. Thus, the lead
underwriter must concede more rents to give them incentives to reveal the truth.
On the other hand, shares are not underpriced when both institutional investors an-
nounce a bad signal. In these cases, the quantities allocated to these informed investors are
the lowest possible (Sk=2), but cannot be zero because retail investors cannot absorb the
whole issue.
When at least one uninformative or one good signal is sent, prices are indeterminate as
long as the incentive compatibility conditions are satised. Again, the optimal mechanism
can be implemented in various ways. The only restriction is that the incentive compati-
bility constraints for an institutional investor with an informative signal g (8) and with an
uninformative signal (9) are satised. This gives rise to informational rents for the institu-
tional investors with a good or an uninformative signal. For instance, the lead underwriter
could only underprice when both institutional investors announce good signals and both
announce uninformative signals.
Retail investors face a winners curse problem, since they only receive shares if the
value of the rm is bad or uncertain. However, this winners curse is less severe than
previously, because they get a positive rent even if they are uninformed.
This is in contrast with previous IPO studies. In many of these studies, the retail
investors have a quite passive role since they only get shares when shares are not underpriced
as in the previous section. Knowing this, they should not bear the risk to participate to
the IPO. However, when institutional investors gather information in di¤erent directions,
retail investors get a positive rent. This gives them a reason to participate to the IPO21.
21One can therefore reasonably think that forming a diversied syndicate will induce retail investors to
participate to the IPO. Informational rents to institutional investors will therefore be reduced and the lead
underwriters willingness to form a diversied syndicate will be reinforced. However, this e¤ect is not taken
into account in my model.
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In fact, due to the independence of the signals, eliciting information becomes more
costly. The lead underwriter must concede informational rents to institutional investors
with an uninformative signal. In order to ensure types separation, the rent granted to
institutional investors with a good signal must be raised. However, instead of conceding
a much higher rent to those institutional investors, this is less costly to concede a part
of it to retail investors. Intuitively, if the lead underwriter allocates to retail investors
the maximum quantity they can absorb, the quantity allocated to institutional investors
with an uninformative signal is reduced. This lowers the benets from misreporting for an
institutional investor with a good signal. This allows the lead underwriter to capture a part
of the informational rent she must give him. This makes protable the allocation of a rent
to retail investors. Moreover, lets note that the greater is the rent given to institutional
investors with an uninformative signal, the greater must be the rent given to retail investors.
Letalso remark that the total loss of expected proceeds from the IPO, L; is equal to:
L = g [[(1  ) + 2(1  ) + ] kS + (1  )S] :
This total loss of expected proceeds from the IPO is an a¢ ne function of the quantity
of shares which cannot be absorbed by the retail investors (kS). Thus, even though the
retail investors could absorb the whole issue, the lead underwriter could not completely
eliminate underpricing as she must give a positive rent to those retail investors. This is
in contrast with the results of the previous section in which the lead underwriter could
eliminate underpricing when retail investors could absorb the whole issue.
Finally, lets note that the quantities allocated to each informed investor are increasing
in the signal he sends, and decreasing in the signal the other informed investor sends.
I must, also, point out that when the institutional investors have di¤erent lines of exper-
tise, more shares are underpriced, which implies a fall in the benets of the lead underwriter.
However, the informational e¢ ciency of the market has been improved, (because more in-
formation is available to the lead underwriter), which implies an increase in those same
benets.
Then, there is an ambiguous e¤ect on the benets of the lead underwriter. Intuitively,
if the gain in informational e¢ ciency compensates the loss in the proceeds of the IPO,
(due to more underpricing), the benets of the lead underwriter may be higher with the
diversication of the lines of expertise than in the specialization in only one line of exper-
tise. Determining when the lead underwriter selects institutional investors with di¤erent
expertise is the objective of the next section.
5 The region of diversication
In the two previous sections, I have respectively computed the expected benets of the
lead underwriter when she selects a specialized organization and a diversied organization.
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This section states conditions under which it is optimal for the lead underwriter to form a
diversied syndicate, i.e. when the latter organization dominates the former.
The expected benets in the case of diversication of information are higher than the
one of specialization when the gain implied by a more accurate information on the value
of the shares is higher than the loss of revenues due to the underpricing of shares in more
states of the nature, necessary to give incentives to institutional investors to tell the truth.
This result is quite intuitive. Indeed, relying on di¤erent lines of expertise allows in-
stitutional investors to have a local monopoly on the information they have gathered, and
thus, they obtain higher informational rents. This is never favorable for the lead under-
writer, if she only maximizes the proceeds resulting from the IPO, since more information
implies more rents and therefore fewer proceeds. However, now, more information improves
the informational e¢ ciency of the market, and hence increases the benets of the lead un-
derwriter. Then, there is a trade o¤ between these two e¤ects and diversication is more
protable than specialization, if the latter e¤ect dominates the former.
5.1 Comparative statics
For purposes of notation, lets call region of diversication, the region where it is in the
interest of the lead underwriter to form a diversied syndicate rather than a specialized one.
Let me also note that the ratio number of shares sold / gain in discovering that the value
of the shares is high, Sg , is in fact a measure of the valuation for collecting information of
the lead underwriter22. The higher is this ratio, the higher is the value of good information
for her.
The following propositions explicitly state this intuition.
Proposition 3 1. The lead underwriter prefers to form a diversied syndicate rather
than a specialized one:
(a) whatever the capacity of the retail investors, (1  k), if the value of information,
=Sg; is high enough and,
(b) up to a certain capacity of the retail investors, if the value of information takes
intermediary values.
2. The lead underwriter always forms a specialized syndicate, if information is not
enough valuable.
3. The region of diversication is extended when the value of collecting information,
=Sg; increases and when the capacity of the retail investors, (1  k); increases.
22There are other possible measures for the value of good information. Here, what I called the value of
information, is the gain from gathering better information by share. We should also use the expected utility
from becoming informed minus the utility of an uninformative type (because if he is uninformed an agent
will announce he has received an uninformative signal).
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The results I obtain are quite intuitive, more the information is valuable, more it is
protable for the lead underwriter to elicit this information. So, forming a diversied
syndicate is more protable than forming a specialized one. In addition, when the capacity
of retail investors increases, the lead underwriter can use it to induce informed investors
to reveal the truth. This reduces informational rents, and as informational e¢ ciency is
improved, the region of diversication is extended.
If the information gathered about the value of the rm is enough valuable for the
lead underwriter, forming a diversied syndicate is always more protable than forming a
specialized one, no matter the degree of participation of the retail investors. This is quite
intuitive. Indeed, when information is highly valuable, the lead underwriter is willing to
elicit all the available information instead of relying on only one line of expertise and hence,
being uninformed about the other line. In this case, the term reecting the informational
e¢ ciency of the market is so high that it always compensates the loss of revenues due to
underpricing.
If information is less valuable, but high enough, there exists a degree of participation
of the retail investors from which forming a diversied syndicate is more protable than
forming a specialized one. Here, the gain from informational e¢ ciency of the market com-
pensates the loss of revenues due to underpricing, but only from a certain degree of partici-
pation of the retail investors. Indeed, a higher degree of participation of the retail investors
in the mechanism lowers the informational rents allocated to institutional investors. This
reduces the costs of inducing institutional investors to truthfully reveal their information.
This makes diversication more protable. In this case, one can remark that a higher retail
investorscapacity reduces the institutional investorslocal monopoly power along their line
of expertise. This benets to the lead underwriter when information is enough valuable for
her.
On the other hand, if information is not enough valuable, it is never protable for the
lead underwriter to form a diversied syndicate, whatever the degree of participation of
the retail investors. In this case, it is optimal for the lead underwriter to always select
institutional investors with the same line of expertise.
Lets now explicitly state the role of ; the probability that the signal is good if it exists.
Corollary 4 1. The lead underwriter prefers to form a diversied syndicate rather than
a specialized one:
(a) whatever , if the valuation of the lead underwriter for information is high
enough and,
(b) for  lower than , otherwise.
2. The region of diversication is extended when  decreases.
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When the valuation of the lead underwriter for information is high enough, she always
prefers a diversied syndicate. Otherwise, the lead underwriter only forms a diversied
syndicate when  is lower than : Moreover, decreasing ; extends the region of diversi-
cation. Intuitively, when  increases, the informational rents increase. As there are more
rents under diversication this makes a diversied organization less protable. When the
lead underwriter places a high valuation for the accuracy of information, the previous e¤ect
has no impact on the optimal organization. However, when her valuation for information
is lower, diversication is more protable only when rents are not too costly, i.e. when  is
low enough.
Finally, let me examine the e¤ects of a variation of ; the probability that information
exists.
Corollary 5 1. If the valuation of the lead underwriter for information is high enough,
she prefers to form a diversied syndicate rather than a specialized one, for  higher
than .
2. The lead underwriter always forms a specialized syndicate, whatever the value of ; if
information is not enough valuable.
3. The region of diversication is extended when  increases.
When her valuation for information is high enough, there exists  such that the lead
underwriter forms a diversied syndicate for  higher than . Otherwise, the lead under-
writer always prefers a specialized syndicate. Increasing ; increases the region of diversi-
cation. The intuition for this result is the following. When  increases, the probability
that information exists increases. This raises the di¤erences in accuracy between the dif-
ferent organizations. The benets from diversication are therefore increased. However,
this is only the case when the lead underwriter places a high valuation for the accuracy
of information. When her valuation for information decreases, the impact of this e¤ect is
reduced.
5.2 Empirical implications
My theoretical analysis emphasizes the role of expertise in the organizational design of IPO
syndicates. It proves that if the lead underwriter may select di¤erent syndicate structures
depending on her valuation for price accuracy. It also provides prediction on the links
between the organization of the syndicate and the ex-ante prior about the rm, as well as
the retail investorsparticipation in the IPO.
To empirically test my model, one would need to have datas on syndicate membersline
of expertise. Such datas are available to check if each syndicate member is for instance,
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either a regional or an international underwriter, or also, either an investment bank or a
commercial bank. Those characteristics could be obtained in a quite easy way.
Empirical evidence that syndicate members play an important role in the IPO process
through information production is presented in Corwin and Schultz (2005). They note that
di¤erent underwriters have di¤erent investorsclientele, but also specialize by geographic
region. Their information production hypothesis suggests that an underwriter is added to
a syndicate in order to gather specic information about demand for an IPO. Diversied
syndicates would therefore arise when the lead underwriter needs a higher amount of infor-
mation for this particular o¤ering. This is likely to be the case when she has a high valuation
for price accuracy. They also nd that another strong determinant for inclusion within a
syndicate is the existence of previous relationships with the lead underwriter. Those rela-
tionships may reduce agency problems and induce syndicate members to exert the necessary
e¤ort to gather information. In my model, previous relationships should be reected by a
higher probability that the information exists,  meaning that a diversied syndicate also
emerges when the probability that the information is collected, ; is high. Corwin and
Schultzs (2005) predictions are therefore consistent with my models predictions.
Song (2004a) shows that syndicates with both investment and commercial banks arise
when rms have lower common stock ranking and less prior access to capital. As investment
banks and commercial banks possess di¤erent comparative advantages in their underwriting
technologies, one could think about them as having di¤erent expertise. Hybrid syndicates,
composed with both investment and commercial banks, are therefore diversied syndicate
in my framework, while pure investment bank syndicates are specialized syndicates. Firms
which have lower common stock ranking and less prior access to capital seem to be more
di¢ cult to underwrite due to a greater information problem. Thus, the lead underwriter
has a great need for informational e¢ ciency for such rms ( high). This is also consistent
with my results.
In the literature of syndicated loans, Su (2005) nds that the syndicate structure is
more concentrated when the rm is opaque and when it is not too risky. With respect
to their notations, opaque rms are rms with no publicly available information and risky
rms have non negligible probabilities of default and relatively high leverage ratios. In my
framework, opaque rms are represented by a low  and risky rms by a low . Lets also
remark that a more concentrated syndicate is a syndicate whom syndicate members have
the same expertise. Those empirical results are conrmed by this papers results.
This model also highlights new testable empirical implications on the organizational
design of IPO syndicates. For instance, it could explain a di¤erence in syndicate structure
among di¤erent market places. Firms listed on the NASDAQ in the US or on the Nouveau
Marche in France are new technology rms. Thus, they su¤er a greater information
problem than rms listed on the NYSE in the US or on the Premier Marche in France
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which are bigger and better known. My predictions suggest that rms going public within
the NASDAQ or the Nouveau Marche need to form a more diversied syndicate than
rms within the NYSE or the Premier Marche.
According to my results, the active participation of retail investors changes with the
syndicate structure. Indeed, when the lead underwriter selects a diversied syndicate struc-
ture, retail investors get a larger amount of shares and a positive rent. One could therefore
test this hypothesis by checking if rms with a high level of retail investors when they go
public are also those which have been underwrote with a diversied syndicate.
6 Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that if the lead underwriter maximizes the total proceeds from
the IPO, but also takes into account price accuracy in the market, it could be in her interest
to collect all the available information in forming a diversied syndicate.
I have shown that when the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate, each in-
vestorsclientele has a local monopoly power on their private information. To extract this
information, she must concede larger informational rents to the investors. This implies that
the shares of the rm are underpriced in more states of the nature than in the previous
case. But, as more information is available to the lead underwriter, informational e¢ ciency
is improved. Even though this allocates higher informational rents to investors, this could
be protable for the lead underwriter depending on her valuation for accurate pricing.
Indeed, if the information gathered about the value of the rm is enough valuable, no
matter the degree of participation of the retail investors, selecting institutional investors
with di¤erent lines of expertise is always more protable than selecting them with the same
line of expertise. However, if information is less valuable, but high enough, there exists a
degree of participation of the retail investors from which selecting institutional investors
with di¤erent lines of expertise is more protable than selecting them with the same line
of expertise. Moreover, diversication is more protable than specialization when the rm
going public is more transparent or riskier, and when the capacity of the retail investors
increases.
Another interesting result of this paper is in contrast with previous IPO studies. In
the classic IPO literature, the retail investors have a quite passive role since they only get
shares when shares are not underpriced whereas they earn positive rents in my framework.
This could be a reasonable reason to explain why they should bear the risk to participate
to the IPO.
An interesting extension could be to assume that collusion between syndicate members
may arise as it is one of the major critics against the book buildingprocess. They could
in this new framework share their information and therefore earn higher rents, more partic-
ularly under specialization. In this case, it seems that the mechanism should not be robust
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and so, that the underwriter has to design a new incentive compatible mechanism in order
to elicit the information she needs. One could also relax the time constraint, and then as-
sume that institutional investors can gather information in both directions. However, this
will introduce a multi dimensional screening problem. Finally, due to my results one can
reasonably think that forming a diversied syndicate may induce retail investors to partic-
ipate to the IPO. Informational rents to institutional investors may therefore be reduced
and the lead underwriters willingness to form a diversied syndicate should be reinforced,
as I note in Section 4. This e¤ect has to be taken into account in a future extension of this
model. These issues are left for future research.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that despite its unusual form, the objective of the
lead underwriter is increasing in the prices, due to the ex post participation constraints.
Despite the perfect correlation of the two institutional investorssignals, the lead under-
writer cannot extract all the investorssurplus, as in Cremer and McLean (1988), in giving
no share to the institutional investors if they announce di¤erent signals, on one hand, be-
cause there exists a non zero probability not to obtain an informative signal, and on the
other hand, because the retail investors cannot absorb the whole issue.
But, the lead underwriter, in order to reduce the incentives to lie, should not give any
shares to the institutional investors, if they announce two contradictory informative signals,
((g; b); (b; g)).
As the signals are perfectly correlated, the quantity allocated to each investor is zero if
one of them announce a good signal while the other one announce a bad signal, q(b; g) =
q(g; b) = 0.
The incentive constraints are now:
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)]
 (1  )q(u; u) [V (g)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (g)  p(g; u)] ; (A.1)
(1  )q(u; u) [V (u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (u)  p(g; u)] + (1  )q(u; b) [V (b)  p(b; u)]
 (1  )q(g; u) [V (u)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)] ;
(A.2)
(1  )q(b; u) [V (b)  p(b; u)] + q(b; b) [V (b)  p(b; b)]
 (1  )q(u; u) [V (b)  p(u; u)] + q(u; b) [V (b)  p(b; u)] ; (A.3)
(1  )q(u; u) [V (u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (u)  p(g; u)] + (1  )q(u; b) [V (b)  p(b; u)]
 (1  )q(b; u) [V (u)  p(b; u)] + (1  )q(b; b) [V (b)  p(b; b)] :
(A.4)
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To solve this problem, I only consider the upward incentive constraints, i.e., (1), and
(4) and I will check ex post that downward incentive constraints are satised23.
Lets rst show that q(b; u) = 0 and p(b; b) = V (b): Indeed, as p(b; u)  V (b) by the
ex post participation constraint, and V (b) < V (u); one must set q(b; u) to its minimum, in
order to relax the constraint (4), i.e., q(b; u) = 0: In the same way, since the uninformed
investors cannot absorb the whole issue, and by (6), one cannot set q(b; b) = 0: To make
(4) more slack without violate the ex post participation constraint, on must therefore set
p(b; b) to its minimum, i.e., p(b; b) = V (b; b):
The incentive constraints are now:
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)]
 (1  )q(u; u) [V (g)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (g)  p(g; u)] ; (A.5)
(1  )q(u; u) [V (u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (u)  p(g; u)]
+(1  )q(u; b) [V (b)  p(b; u)]  0: (A.6)
The incentive constraint (4) is then automatically satised (with ex post participation
constraints), so one can drop it. Moreover, as p(b; u) only appears in this constraint and
the objective of the lead underwriter is increasing in the prices, it is optimal to set p(b; u)
to its maximum, p(b; u) = V (b)
Now, two cases are possible.
First, when there is no underpricing if one institutional investor announce a good signal
and the other that he is uninformed, i.e., p(g; u) = V (g): (1) becomes:
q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)]  (1  )q(u; u) [V (g)  p(u; u)] :
Secondly, when there is underpricing in state (g; u); p(g; u) < V (g); to relax (1), one
must set q(u; g) to its minimum, q(u; g) = 0; and (1) becomes
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)]  (1  )q(u; u) [V (g)  p(u; u)] :
Then, the rst case is only a particular case of the second one. Hence, I only consider
the case in which there is underpricing in state (g; u); p(g; u) < V (g) and q(u; g) = 0:
Again, to make (1) slack, and as q(u; u) > 0 (by (6), let me set p(u; u) to its maximum,
p(u; u) = V (u):
The incentive constraint (1) becomes:
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)]
 g(1  )q(u; u):
(A.7)
This constraint must be binding. Indeed, if it is not the case, and as the objective of
the lead underwriter is increasing in the prices, it would su¢ ce to increase the prices to
bind it.
23See La¤ont and Martimort (2002) for a general characterization of adverse selection problems.
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I can now write the objective function of the lead underwriter in this way:
E(1) = SE(V )  [2Ug + 2(1  )Ub + 2(1  )Uu + Un]  f(1) ; (A.8)
where, Ug; Ub; Uu; are, respectively the informational rents of institutional investors who
have received a good signal, a bad signal, an uninformative signal and Un is the rent that
retail investors expect to get ex ante.
The lead underwriter maximizes this objective function with respect to the prices, under
the constraints:
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g)  p(g; g)] = g(1  )q(u; u);
p(b; b) = V (b);
p(b; u) = V (b);
p(u; u) = V (u):
Then, this objective function is now:
E(1) = SE(V )  f(1) (A.9)
 2g(1  )q(u; u)
 2(1  ) [S   q(g; u)] [V (g)  p(g; u)]
 22 [S   2q(g; g)] [V (g)  p(g; g)]
As this objective is decreasing in q(u; u); one must set q(u; u) to its minimum, i.e.,
q(u; u) = kS=2: It is increasing in q(g; u) and q(g; g) as long as there is underpricing in
the corresponding state of nature. If it is not the case the quantity is not determined by
equilibrium conditions. Lets remark that there is underpricing in at least one of the states
of nature, (g; g) or (g; u): q(g; g) and q(g; u) must therefore be set to their maximum, i.e.
q(g; g) = S=2 and q(g; u) = S when there is underpricing in the corresponding state of
nature and are not determined otherwise.
Lets also remark that q(b; b) and q(u; b) are indeterminate. Thus, the optimal mecha-
nism does not require that retail investors do not participate to the mechanism.
And, nally, we have (
Ug = (1  )g kS2
Uu = Ub = Un = 0
Moreover, when at least one good signal is sent, prices are indeterminate as long as the
incentive compatibility conditions are satised.
Finally, the expected benets of the lead underwriter are:
E(1) = SE(V )
 (1  )gkS   f(1)
(A.10)
I can now verify that all constraints are satised with this optimal contract.
26
Proof of Proposition 2. The incentive constraints of this problem, using the infor-
mational rents of the institutional investors, are:
Ug  Uu + g [(1  )q(u; u) + q(u; g) + (1  )q(u; b)]
Uu  Ug   g [(1  )q(g; u) + q(g; g) + (1  )q(g; b)]
Ub  Uu   b [(1  )q(u; u) + q(u; g) + (1  )q(u; b)]
Uu  Ub + b [(1  )q(b; u) + q(b; g) + (1  )q(b; b)]
Ub  Ug   (g + b) [(1  )q(g; u) + q(g; g) + (1  )q(g; b)]
Ug  Ub + (g + b) [(1  )q(b; u) + q(b; g) + (1  )q(b; b)]
In adding the incentive constraints of an institutional investor whose type is (g) and (u)
and of one whose type is (u) and (b); I get:
(1  )q(g; u) + q(g; g) + (1  )q(g; b)
 (1  )q(u; u) + q(u; g) + (1  )q(u; b)
 (1  )q(b; u) + q(b; g) + (1  )q(b; b)
(A.11)
Thanks to this monotonicity constraint, one can show that local incentive constraints,
(8) and (9) imply the global one, (10).
One can remark that institutional investors receiving a signal tend to lie and to announce
a lower signal. Thus, lets only consider these incentive constraints and check ex post that
incentives constraints where the institutional investor announce a better signal than he has
received are satised.
Let me write the relevant incentive constraints and check ex post that the others are
satised:
(1  )q(g; u) [V (g; u)  p(g; u)] + q(g; g) [V (g; g)  p(g; g)]
+(1  )q(g; b) [V (g; b)  p(g; b)]  (1  )q(u; u) [V (g; u)  p(u; u)]
+q(u; g) [V (g; g)  p(g; u)] + (1  )q(u; b) [V (g; b)  p(b; u)]
(A.12)
(1  )q(u; u) [V (u; u)  p(u; u)] + q(u; g) [V (g; u)  p(g; u)]
+(1  )q(u; b) [V (b; u)  p(b; u)]  (1  )q(b; u) [V (u; u)  p(b; u)]
+q(b; g) [V (g; u)  p(b; g)] + (1  )q(b; b) [V (b; u)  p(b; b)]
(A.13)
In order to make these constraints more slack, let me set q(b; u) and q(b; g) to their
minimum, because due to the ex post participation constraints, one have p(b; u)  V (b; u) <
V (u; u); and p(b; g)  V (b; g) < V (g; u): This implies that q(b; u) = q(b; g) = 0: In the same
way, as by (6) q(b; b) > 0; set p(b; b) to its maximum, p(b; b) = V (b; b):
As in the proof of Proposition 1 to make the incentive constraints more slack, one can
either set q(u; g) to its minimum, or set p(g; u) to its maximum. The program of the lead
underwriter in the second case being a particular case of the program in the rst one, lets
only consider the latter. So let me set q(u; g) = 0:
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This allows me to write the incentive constraints as:
Ug  Uu + g [(1  )q(u; u) + (1  )q(u; b)] (A.14)
Uu  Ub + b [(1  )q(b; b)] (A.15)
Again, these constraints must be binding. Indeed, if it was not the case, and as the
objective of the sell is increasing in the prices, it would su¢ ce to increase the prices to bind
it. So, one have:
Uu = gq(b; b); (A.16)
Ug = g [(1  )q(u; u) + (1  )q(u; b) + q(b; b)] ; with g = (1  )b); (A.17)
Since, according to (6), I have q(b; b) > 0; the only way to satisfy this constraint is to
underprice when at least an institutional investor receives either an uninformative signal or
a good one.
I also have to add the only relevant ex post participation constraints of the uninformed
investors which are:
qu(u; b) [V (b; u)  p(b; u)]  0
qu(u; u) [V (u; u)  p(u; u)]  0
qu(g; u) [V (g; u)  p(g; u)]  0
qu(g; b) [V (g; b)  p(g; b)]  0
qu(g; g) [V (g; g)  p(g; g)]  0
Let me write the objective function of the lead underwriter in this way:
E(2) = SE(V )  SE(V   p)  f(1  2) (A.18)
The lead underwriter maximizes this objective function with respect to the prices and
the quantities, under the constraints:
Ug = g [(1  )q(u; u) + (1  )q(u; b) + q(b; b)]
Uu = g [q(b; b)]
p(b; b) = V (b; b)
This allows me to write the lead underwriters objective as
E(2) = SE(V )  S
266666664
(1  )2 [V (u; u)  p(u; u)]
+2(1  )(1  )Uu (1 )q(u;u)[V (u;u) p(u;u)](1 )q(u;b)
+2(1  ) [V (g; u)  p(g; u)]
+22 [V (g; g)  p(g; g)]
+2(1  )2Ug (1 )q(g;u)[V (g;u) p(g;u)] q(g;g)[V (g;u) p(g;g)](1 )q(g;b)
377777775
This expression being decreasing in q(b; b); and increasing in q(g; g), q(g; u) and q(g; b);
I must set q(b; b) to its minimum, i.e., q(b; b) = kS=2; and q(g; g), q(g; u), and q(g; b) to
their maximum, i.e.: q(g; g) = S=2, and q(g; u) = q(g; b) = S:
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However, I cannot compute q(u; u) and q(u; b) in a direct way because Ug depends on
those quantities. Lets rst derive the derivatives with respect to q(u; u); q(u; b); p(u; u)
using q(g; b) = S.
dE(2)
dq(u; u)
=
2(1  )2S
q(u; b)
[V (u; u)  p(u; u)]  2(1  )g
dE(2)
dq(u; b)
=
2(1  )(1  )S
q(u; b)

Uu   (1  )q(u; u) [V (u; u)  p(u; u)]
(1  )q(u; b)

  2(1  )2g
dE(2)
dp(u; u)
=
(1  )2S
q(u; b)
[q(u; b)  2q(u; u)]
Moreover, as (A.15) is binding, dE(2)dp(u;u) and
dE(2)
dp(u;b) have opposite signs. Consequently,
the sign of those derivatives only depends on the sign of [q(u; b)  2q(u; u)] : This allows me
to derive three cases.
1. [q(u; b)  2q(u; u)] = 0: In this case, I must have dE(2)dq(u;u) < 0 and dE(2)dq(u;b) < 0: Indeed, if
it was not the case, those derivatives would both be non negative. This would imply
that
q(u; u)
dE(2)
dq(u; u)
+ q(u; b)
dE(2)
dq(u; b)
 0
() gS [(k   1)(1  )  2(1  )]  0
However, this is impossible as k  1: Thus, when [q(u; b)  2q(u; u)] = 0 dE(2)dq(u;u) and
dE(2)
dq(u;b) are negative and the optimal quantities are q(u; u) =
kS
2 ; and q(u; b) = kS:
2. [q(u; b)  2q(u; u)] < 0: This imply that dE(2)dp(u;u) < 0 and dE(2)dp(u;b) > 0: I therefore have(
p(b; u) = V (b; u)
(1  )q(u; u) [V (u; u)  p(u; u)] = Uu
Adding this in E(2) gives that this expression is decreasing in q(u; u), and q(u; b);
implying that 2q(u; u) = q(u; b) = kS:
3. [q(u; b)  2q(u; u)] > 0: This imply that dE(2)dp(u;u) > 0 and dE(2)dp(u;b) < 0: I therefore have(
p(u; u) = V (u; u)
(1  )q(u; b) [V (b; u)  p(b; u)] = Uu
Again, adding this in E(2) gives that this expression is decreasing in q(u; u), and
q(u; b); implying that 2q(u; u) = q(u; b) = kS:
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Consequently, the optimal quantities are q(u; u) = kS2 ; and q(u; b) = kS:
This allows me to write Un the rent that retail investors expect to get ex ante as
Un = 2(1  )(1  k)
k
Uu:
And, nally, we have8>>>><>>>>:
Ug = g

(1  )kS2 + (1  )kS +  kS2

Uu = g
kS
2
Ub = 0
Un = (1  )g(1  k)S
Moreover, when at least one uninformative or one good signal is sent, prices are inde-
terminate as long as the incentive compatibility conditions are satised.
Finally, the expected benets of the lead underwriter are:
E(2) = SE(V )
 gS [[(1  ) + 2(1  ) + ] k + (1  )]
 f(1  2)
(A.19)
I can now verify that all constraints are satised with this optimal contract.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let me write the di¤erence between the benets if the lead
underwriter selects institutional investors with di¤erent lines of expertise, and if she selects
them with the same line of expertise:
E(2)  E(1) =  g [S [[(1  ) + 2(1  ) + ] k + (1  )]]
+g(1  )kS
+

f(1)  f(1  2) (A.20)
Finally, the expression of the di¤erence of the benets becomes:
E(2)  E(1) =  gS [(1  ) + [2(1  ) + ] k]
+

f(1)  f(1  2) (A.21)
The lead underwriter prefers to form a diversied syndicate when this di¤erence is
positive.
This denes a critical values  and k such that for all    or for all k  k; the
lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate. Those values are dened by
 = Sg
(2  )2k + (1  )
f(1)  f(1  2)
k =

Sg
f(1)  f(1  2)
(2  )2  
(1  )
(2  )
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Lets note that,
k  0
,   Sg (1  )
f(1)  f(1  2)
So, when  is high enough, the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate when k is
lower than k. Otherwise, the lead underwriter never composes a diversied syndicate.
Lets also remark that as E(2)  E(1) is non negative when  = 0; and as
d [E(2)  E(1)]
d
=  2k2(1  )Sg < 0;
the lead underwriter forms a diversied syndicate for all    if   1 and for all 
if  > 1: Moreover,  > 1 is equivalent to E(2)  E(1) > 0 for  = 1: This gives
E(2)  E(1)j=1 =  gS [(1  ) + k]
+

f(1)  f(1  2) : (A.22)
This expression is positive if and only if
 >
Sg [(1  ) + k]
f(1)  f(1  2) (A.23)
This means that when  is high enough, the lead underwriter always prefers a diversied
syndicate. Otherwise, the lead underwriter only forms a diversied syndicate when  is
lower than :
Analyzing the role of  on the region of diversication is less trivial. I rst compute the
derivative of the di¤erence in benets with respect to :
d [E(2)  E(1)]
d
=  Sg [(1  2) + 2(2  )k] + 2f 0(1  2)
This derivative is negative when  = 0: Moreover, when  = 0; E(2)   E(1) = 0:
This means that this di¤erence decreases when one rises a little bit from 0: However, for
all   ; one have
d [E(2)  E(1)]
d
 Sg

+ (2(2  )k + 2(1  ))

2f 0(1  2)
f(1)  f(1  2)   1

 0
Indeed, as f 00(:)  0; I have

2f 0(1 2)
f(1) f(1 2)   1

 0:
This means that if there exists  such that E(2)   E(1) is non negative, for all
  ; E(2)   E(1) is non negative. Let me add that such a  exists if and only if
E(2)  E(1) > 0 for  = 1; or
E(2)  E(1)j=1 =  gS (2  ) k
+ [f(1)  f(0)] > 0 (A.24)
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This gives
 >
Sg (2  ) k
f(1)  f(0) (A.25)
Thus, when  is high enough, there exists  such that the lead underwriter composes
a diversied syndicate for  higher than . Otherwise, the lead underwriter never forms a
diversied syndicate.
Finally, one can check that  is increasing in k and in  and is decreasing in : In the
same way, k is increasing in  and in  and is decreasing in :
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